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Karol Wojtyła’s Conception of Personhood 
from the Perspective of Cognitive Sciences
Abst rac t: We use the term “person” when we want to point out that human existence is 
unrepeatable and unique. The assumption that man is a person constitutes a basis for the 
belief in the dignity, efficacy, and responsibility of the human individual. Karol Wojtyla 
built his conception of the person in the context of theological and philosophical discus-
sions. Even though Wojtyła’s conception has been given a great deal of scholarly attention, 
it is worthwhile to juxtapose it with contemporary anthropological theories that derive from 
cognitive sciences. Cognitivists usually base their theories on biological and sociological 
premises. Some conclusions arrived at in the area of the cognitive sciences lead to mind-
brain reductionism, a theory in which the human being is regarded as a body endowed with 
the function of the brain and as an entity whose individual traits are shaped by its social 
and cultural environment. This position undermines the ideas of free will and the substan-
tial singularity of the human person. However, debates with this position have worked out 
a non-reductionist alternative, a theory known as emergentism. This theory treats the hu-
man mind as a distinct faculty, one which emerges as a phase in the brain’s development. 
Emergentists base their reasoning on the assumptions that the body is a unity and that 
the mind is not identical with it. It is my belief that emergentism can be fruitfully applied 
to the dynamic understanding of the person put forward by Wojtyła in the middle of the 
20th century. 
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Introduction
The idea of personhood has ontological and ethical aspects, such as: (1) the 
concept of the person points to the unique character of human existence in the 
world; (2) it underscores the individual aspect of human experience; (3) it em-
phasises the wholeness of the person, which, in the traditional formulation, is 
a unity of body and soul; (4) it points to the necessity of showing the respect that 
is due to every human being; the person ought not to be treated instrumentally, 
as a means to a goal, but always as a goal in itself. These aspects allow us to 
link other ideas to that of “the person,” such as that of “personal dignity”; and 
then, too, we point to the special value of the person in relation to the real world 
of things as well as to social and political institutions. 
The idea of “the person” is defined in a number of ways, and it is not my aim 
in this article to discuss these definitions, but to present the tension between the 
personalist and cognitivist outlook on man. The recognition of the value of the 
human person is inherent as a basic principle in Western culture, which is built 
on a grid of concepts derived from Greek philosophy and made permanent by 
Christian thought. The distinctness of the human person is, in this respect, to 
be regarded in a normative sense. This by no means ought to prevent us from 
using the idea of personhood in the context of Eastern cultures. According to 
anthropologists, in the East it is common to believe in a strong interdependence 
between an individual and the community within which he or she functions. 
Assumptions concerning an individual person’s relations with a community con-
stitute a point of departure for cultural studies and also, recently, for cultural 
neuroscience, which combines the methods of social and cultural psychology.1 
Yet this problem falls beyond the remit of this article.
Cognitivism is a relatively new discipline which combines various areas of 
knowledge concerned with the principles of the functioning of the brain in rela-
tion to the body, as well as to the natural and human environment. The different 
subdisciplines of cognitivism derive from a number of particular sciences: from 
formal ones like logic, mathematics, information technology through natural 
sciences, such as biology; social sciences, such as psychology2; and from the 
humanities, such as philosophy. This manner of combining subdisciplines does 
1 See Shihiu Han, Georg Northoff, Kai Vogeley, Bruce E. Wexler, Shinobu Kitayama, and 
Michael E. W. Varnum, “A Cultural Neuroscience Approach to the Biosocial Nature of the 
Humane Brain,” Annual Review of Psychology, vol. 64, (2013), https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-
psych-071112-054629. The article contains a copious list of publications concerned with cultu-
ral neuroscience.
2 See Urszula Żegleń, “Znaczenie filozofii dla kognitywistyki [The Meaning of Philosophy 
for Cognitivism],” in: Przewodnik po kognitywistyce [Cognitivism: A Guidebook] ed. Józef Bre-
mer (Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM, 2016), 39–78.
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not prevent collisions, as demonstrated, for instance, by all the diverse ways of 
understanding human nature. In recent years, cognitive science has drawn ever 
closer to neuroscience—including neurobiology—which studies the anatomy 
and physiology of the brain. Cognitivism may belong among the humanities 
and social sciences, and yet cognitivists readily employ empirical research and 
computer-assisted imaging techniques (MRI, FMRI, PET, and others). Emerg-
ing from a combination of different disciplines and the conceptions they have 
developed, cognitivism has not yet produced a central, unifying theory. In 
a narrower sense, the goal of cognitivism is to analyze man’s cognitive abili-
ties and to examine the conditions necessary for their operation; in a broader 
sense, its goal is to describe and explain the principles of cognition in living 
organisms, and to define the rules determining the acquisition of the knowledge 
of the surrounding physical world and of the knowing subject, on the basis 
of empirical research. Cognitivist anthropology, which studies biological sys-
tems and the influence of artificial intelligence on human life, is distinguished 
from cognitive anthropology, which has for its object the rules that govern the 
ways in which culture influences the human brain. The latter discipline stud-
ies language, cultural narratives, interpersonal relations, and man’s conduct as 
a social being.3 Polish researchers who work within the field of cognitive an-
thropology have taken up the topic of personhood in several substantial studies 
and texts.4 
In this article I undertake an analysis of Karol Wojtyła’s conception of per-
sonhood, which I want to juxtapose with the cognitive view on man. Wojtyła’s 
main work in the field of human anthropology, The Acting Person (In Polish 
known as Osoba i czyn), was written in the late 1960s; it has since been a sub-
ject of creative interpretations and polemics. Wojtyła’s tract is devoted to man 
and to man’s relation to his biological and social environment. As far as his 
method is concerned, Wojtyła uses two basic sources: (1) the tradition of Thom-
istic realism: the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas and his 20th-century interpret-
ers, Reginald Gerrigou-Lagrange, Etienne Gilson, Stefan Świeżawski, and oth-
3 See Roy D’Andradde, The Development of Cognitive Anthropology (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995 ), XIV–XV.
4 See Józef Bremer, Osoba – fikcja czy rzeczywistość [Person – Fiction or Reality]/ (Kra-
ków: Wydawnictwo WAM, 2008); Józef Bremer, Neoronaukowcy i potoczny obraz osoby w ko-
gnitywistyce [Neuroscientists and the Common Image of the Person in Cognitivism]. (Kraków: 
Wydawnictwo WAM, 2016); Józef Bremer, Problem osoby w świetle neuronauk. Czy osoba to 
jedynie użyteczna metafora? [The Problem of Personhood in Light of Neurosciences: Is the Per-
son Anything But a Useful Metaphor?]. STD, nr 4 (2018), https://doi.org/10.15290/std., 11–27. 
Włodzisław Duch wrote in a slightly different sense about the issues and responsibility in the 
context of cognitive research See: Włodzisław Duch, “Czy jesteśmy automatami? Mózgi, wol-
na wola i odpowiedzialność” [Are We Automatons? Brains, Free Will and Responsibility?], in 
Na ścieżkach neuronauki [On the Paths of Neuroscience], ed. Piotr Francuz (Lublin: Wydawnic-
two KUL, 2010), 219–264. 
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ers; (2) phenomenology, known from his study of the thought of Maks Scheler,5 
in Wojtyła’s critical reinterpretation. The moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant 
was also a major inspiration for Wojtyła’s ethical deliberations. My aim in this 
article is to focus on those aspects of Wojtyła’s conception of personhood which 
allow it to enter into dialogue with the conception of man accepted by chosen 
cognitivists.6
Nature and the Person
Wojtyła’s conception of personhood is based on three types of premises: meta-
physical, religious, and cultural. As it would be difficult to discuss all the aspects 
of The Acting Person in this article, I have decided to focus on the following 
elements: human nature, the dynamics of becoming a person, the psychosomatic 
unity of the soul and the body, and personal freedom. 
Human nature can be understood in three different ways: (1) as a substance: 
the nature in question determines the belonging of an entity to a species; pos-
sessing a nature means that a person differs from other entities (animals, plants, 
and inanimate beings, all of which are deprived of the feature of rationality); 
(2) normatively: possessing a particular nature means that man has to perform 
particular tasks; it defines obligations (which determine what man ought to do 
due to the good that is in accord with human nature). Normative understanding 
also delineates limitations for human actions, the violation of which entails the 
infringement of an essential good; (3) as an entity belonging to nature: as when 
we point out that the human being possesses a body and belongs to the sensory 
realm. The term “to possess” refers to a relational situation, which means that 
there is in us something that controls the operation of the body. Here clearly 
appears the suggestion that outside the body, there is a decision-making center 
that controls the body, that is, the soul or the mind. 
In medieval philosophy, to which Wojtyła is indebted in the context of the 
problem of personhood, a major role was played by the principle of individuali-
5 Karol Wojtyła, Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach sys-
temu Maksa Schelera [An Appraisal of the Possibility of Building Christian Ethics on the Prin-
ciples of Maks Scheler’s System], in Człowiek i moralność II: Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności 
[Man and Morality II: The Problem of the Moral Subject], ed. Tadeusz Styczeń, Jerzy W. Gał-
kowski, Adam Rodziński, and Andrzej Szostek (Lublin: TN KUL), 11–129.
6 In the linguistic context, the author of this article refered to a text by Jameson Taylor, 
“Beyond Nature: Karol Wojtyla’s Development of the Traditional Definition of Personhood.” 
The Review of Metaphisics, vol. 63, no. 2 (2009): 415–454. Taylor cites and analyzes extensively
from Wojtyła’s book The Acting Person. 
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zation, that is, the problem of to what we owe the fact that we are distinct enti-
ties. This is the principle thanks to which a person acquires his or her individu-
ality. It follows from Boethius’s classic definition according to which the person 
is “an individual substance of a rational nature” (persona est naturae rationalis 
individua substantia).7 In order to be a person, a being needs to be a rational 
entity, a substance made up of matter and form. “Person” is not a general desig-
nation but refers to an entity that exists in reality. Boethius’s definition captures 
the essence of personhood in a static manner, while the contemporary ways to 
understand human nature underscore the dynamics of becoming a person. This 
makes Wojtyła’s conception relevant. 
The aspect of a person’s individual existence was of interest to, among other 
philosophers, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus. Thomas defined the per-
son as the thing, in all of the natural world, that is the most perfect (persona 
significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota rerum natura). In this sense, the 
wholeness and uniqueness of a person consists in its being a value which must 
not be modified or changed. In order to protect the entirety of a person’s exist-
ence, no constituent part of the person should be altered. In Thomas Aquinas’s 
anthropology, the human soul is not a complete dimension of the person; it is 
the body that endows a person with the particularity of individual existence. 
The human being is an inseparable unity of the soul and the body, a unity 
of elements which together form the whole that is the compositum humanum.8 
John Duns Scotus wrote about the principle of individualization in a different 
sense. He used the untranslatable term haecceitas, which refers, not to matter, 
but to the essence which endows an entity with individuality, bestowing distinct 
properties on things and people, and thus rendering them singular. Haecceitas 
influences the properties that belong to and determine an individual entity and 
it is thanks to haecceitas that a human being has the features of indivisibility, 
identity, actuality, and singularity. A multiplication of individuals representing 
the same species means greater perfection in the world, as different from a mul-
tiplication of the species as such.9 
One of the consequences following from the thought of John Duns Scotus 
is the linking of the individual person with the soul (the mind) rather than the 
body, as is the case in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Human souls are 
individual due to singular personal characteristics which cannot be reduced to 
7 Ancius M. S. Boethius, Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy, trans. 
Hugh F. Steward, Edward K. Rand and Jim Tester (Oxford: The Project Gutenberg, 2004), 33.
8 See: Saint Thomas Aquinas, Basic Writings, ed. Anton C. Pegis, vol. 2: Man and the Con-
duct of Life (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 688–690.
[“Person” signifies what is most perfect in all nature—that is, a subsistent individual of a ra-
tional nature. Summa Theologiae I, q. 29, a. 3].
9 See: Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 330–335.
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sensory or formal aspects. In this sense, haecceitas goes beyond common na-
ture, and the individual itself is more perfect than the nature that determines its 
structure as a representative of a species.10 John Duns Scotus’s conception of 
haecceitas had a greater impact on modern philosophy than Thomas Aquinas’s 
conception of the integral unity of the soul and the body.11 For Descartes, man’s 
individual properties relate to the soul (the mind), which exists independently 
of the body. The soul determines the identity of the individual and ensures the 
unity of the sensory perception of the world. Thanks to the soul, a person can 
connect his or her own external and internal experiences to make them into 
a whole, into a unique perception of events. The body, on the other hand, is 
like a machine actuated by life energy that has its source in the activity of the 
soul. In Descartes’s philosophy, a person’s mental distinctiveness has its source 
in the thinking soul (ego cogito), thanks to which man gains the awareness of 
“I,” that is, an individual’s volitional and emotional subjectivity. If it is the soul 
(the mind) that safeguards the subject’s mental unity, then it is the soul—and not 
the body, or the unity of the body and the soul—that safeguards an individual’s 
personal identity, and its singularity and distinctness. Wojtyła did not accept 
Descartes’s conception in the just outlined mind-body problem; he embraced 
that of Thomas Aquinas and pointed to the psychosomatic unity of the soul and 
the body. The mentioning of Descartes is not accidental in this context. Refer-
ences to Cartesianism (rather than to Descartes) occur quite often in the context 
of mind-body debates. In the realm of cognitive sciences, scholars accept the 
naturalistic thesis that suggests a link between the mind and the brain, and 
which rejects the Cartesian proposition concerning the substantive difference 
and separation between the body and the soul. In addition, cognitivists consist-
ently question the existence of a will that is independent of the body, functioning 
independently of the brain and responsible for a person’s free decisions. The 
mind-body relation constitutes an important issue in attempts to explain the 
singularity of a person. Cognitivists, such as Daniel Dennett, reject Descartes’s 
dualistic thesis concerning the substantive difference between the mind and the 
body, but they also disregard the Aristotelian-Thomistic thesis about the psy-
chosomatic unity of the mind and the body in one personal entity, precisely the 
thesis which Wojtyła found convincing.
But let us turn to the problem of human nature. According to Woltyła, this 
term denotes everything that is essentially human. However, “nature” and “es-
sence” seem to have different referents. “Nature” does not denote a concrete 
10 See: John Boler, “Transcending the Natural: Duns Scotus on the Two Affections of the 
Will,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 67 (1993), 109–126.
11 In this article it is not possible to discuss in detail the links between the philosophy of 
John Duns Scotus and modern conceptions of man. See: Reforging the Great Chain of Being, 
Studies of the History of Modal Theories, ed. Simo Knuuttila, Synthese Historical Library 20 
(Dordrechet: Springer Netherlands 1981).
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existing and acting subject. When we speak of human nature, we point to what 
inheres in a person in a physical sense. We can consider human nature in the 
abstract, as something detached from concrete individuals, but, in reality, it is 
always connected with particular entities. Human nature directly indicates what 
essentially characterizes all people. Moreover, human nature is oriented towards 
agency, towards dynamism. The first act of dynamism is human nature; from 
human nature follow all activities. Birth is the initial moment of this dyna-
mism.12 The dynamism which presupposes potentiality constitutes a basic aspect 
of human nature; it is found in the human being’s readiness to act. This readi-
ness is pre-given to the person; it has been prepared in its substantive dynamic 
structure. Human nature does not determine this dynamism in its entirety, but 
it does accurately determine its moment of change. Human nature manifests 
itself in the ability to act (modus), but the actions themselves are manifestations 
of the human being as a distinct person. We are talking here about the kind 
of agency which allows for a transition from what is owed to human nature to 
what belongs to the dimension of personal existence. The actions of a person 
contain agency, which brings to manifestation a particular “I” and allows this 
“I” to become aware of itself. This means transcending the state of nature in 
the biological sense, not through the rejection of one’s nature, but through its 
integration with the mind. The entirety of a person is expressed in human expe-
rience, where a synthesis takes place, in a person, of the actualizations of those 
aspects of human nature upon which the person has no influence, with actions 
that result from the person’s choices. An action or a deed (the actus humanus) 
is a manifestation of an individual’s distinct consciousness. As the cause of all 
its deeds and, moreover, conscious of this status, a person is capable of captur-
ing and describing this moment. The integration of human nature within a per-
son—suppositum—makes it possible to attain and experience the unity of the 
two aspects: potentiality and actuality.
According to Wojtyła, human nature in its metaphysical sense is man’s es-
sence; it constitutes the humanity in man. On the one hand, a person is “indi-
vidualized” humanity; on the other, a person makes itself present in its actions 
and hence the integration of human nature and humanity takes place in a person 
and through a person and involves the integration of all the dynamism which is 
proper to man. This connection with metaphysical nature does not deprive the 
person of freedom. Man’s potentiality is linked with his nature in situations in 
which he as the subject discovers “he can do something but does not have to.” 
Wojtyła points to two dimensions of transcendence—vertical and horizontal. 
The former is basic and finds its expression in free activity, in a person’s con-
12 Karol Wojtyla, The Acting Person, ed. Anna T. Tymieniecka, translated from the Polish 
by A. Potocki, Analecta Husserliana, vol. X (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), 
126.
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scious efficacy and not just through an [act of] intentionally directing the will 
or desires towards a goal. Becoming a person means moving from a state of 
dependency on one’s environment to dependency on the “I,” that is, on one’s 
self. Being a person involves transcending nature towards the actualization of 
man’s potentiality in personal existence.13
In his or her action a person defines himself/herself by self-possession, self-
governance, self-determination, and self-consciousness. A person is a being that 
owns oneself; at the same time, it is a being that is exclusively owned by itself. 
This kind of argumentation presupposes the existence of free will in man, which 
makes possible the taking of decisions. Thanks to self-determination, man has 
control over himself as well as power over himself and his actions. A person’s 
freedom manifests itself as a personal attribute which relates to free will and 
the ability to decide and act freely.14
When discussing Wojtyła’s conception, we need to take into account the 
aspect of going beyond (transcending) biological nature. Self-determination al-
lows us to distinguish between dynamism on the level of human nature and dy-
namism on the level of the person. In the former, there is no self-determination 
but rather “actualizations,” or the type of activity with no influence from the 
individual will; in the latter, however, we acknowledge the dependence of the 
will on the activity of a person’s own “I.” In the dynamism on the level of 
human nature, the individual is, as it were, owned by the potentiality of its 
own subject, which determines the direction and the character of the dynamics 
of personal life. The experience that comes with the discovery that “I am an 
agent” distinguishes it from the manifestations of the dynamism of man’s activ-
ity which lack the moment of “I”-agency.15 There is a difference here between 
the one who performs an action and the one who is an action’s conscious origi-
nator. This latter occurs when a person acts out his or her own choices, rather 
than being compelled by an instinct or a biological impulse. The justification 
of the ability to make free choices is important insofar as it constitutes man as 
a substantially distinct person.
The idea of a conscious and free “I” lies at the foundation of Wojtyła’s 
conception of legal and moral responsibility. A refusal to acknowledge per-
sonal agency undermines the essence of that responsibility. A person’s inde-
pendence is constituted, not through its lack of dependence on external factors, 
but through an unhampered subjection of the will to the directives of reason. 
Independence is not at issue but the finding of appropriate arguments to support 
the idea of self-dependence. Freedom manifests itself not through the lifting of 
13 Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 131–134.
14 Karol Wojtyła, The Transcendence of the Person in Action and Man’s Self-Teleology, Ana-
lecta Husserlina, vol. IX: The Teleologies in Husserlian Phenomenology, ed. Anna T. Tymieniec-
ka (Dordrechet: D. Reidel Publishing Company), 203–212.
15 Wojtyła, The Acting Person, 163–167.
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barriers, but through a person’s ability to accept internal and external circum-
stances and conditions that determine acting. The rationality of a person’s moral 
choices comes from the fact that proper conduct is a consequence of his or her 
discovery of its righteousness; it does not come from fear of punishment or an 
expectation of being rewarded by other people.16 
This brief reconstruction of Karol Wojtyla’s conception of personhood has 
hopefully put into relief the problematics of the person, conscious choice, free 
will, and the theories of man implied by cognitive studies. 
The Person from the Cognitive Perspective
Philosophical and cognitive models of understanding man differ significantly in 
their premises and methodological perspectives. Wojtyła accepted realistic prin-
ciples governing the existence of the human person and was also aware of the 
benefits of the phenomenological analysis of human consciousness and of man’s 
inner experiences. Wojtyła’s conception of personhood represents the tradition 
of the substantive understanding of the person as an entity that guarantees the 
continuous identity of the self throughout a person’s life. In contradistinction to 
this position is the a non-substantive one, according to which personal identity 
depends on the permanence of a person’s memory of his or her past states and 
experiences. According to theorists who represent the non-substantive concep-
tion of personhood, while people forget certain past acts or minds modify the 
events they store, it can become difficult to speak of a person’s “permanent 
identity.” As a consequence, changing consciousness is a vehicle for changing 
personal identity. John Locke, the classic British empiricist, was among the pro-
ponents of this theory; Derek Parfit is a contemporary one. Conceptions worked 
out in the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of the mind support the dynamic theory of 
the development of the conscious “I” and call into doubt substantive solutions.17 
In this school of thought, the term “individual entity” is preferred to that of 
a “person.”18
16 See Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphsics of Morals: A German-English Edi-
tion, edited and translated by Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2011), 54–57.
17 See: John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Roger WoolHouse 
(London: Publishing Books Ltd., 1997), 472; Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), 248–252. 
18 One of the interesting exceptions is the metaphysical theory of individual enti-
ties put forth by Peter S. Strawson. See his Individuals. An Essay in Desciriptive Mataphi-
sics (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1987, 1959). Strawson combines metaphysical analyses 
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In a general sense, the cognitive sciences are not concerned with man’s sub-
jective experiences, but provide descriptions of objective and general phenom-
ena occurring in the human brain. Their main purpose is to explain the process 
whereby multiple neuronic impulses give rise to an individual human conscious-
ness, in which, at some point, the awareness of a distinct “I” manifests itself.19 In 
a sense, cognitivism brings a broadening of the scope of research represented by 
the philosophy of the mind which has closer affinities with John Locke’s concep-
tion of man than with that of Descartes. Thomas Nagel, among other scholars, 
believed that the individual consciousness of one’s “I” (of personhood) is not 
connected with any additional dimension of human life beyond its biological and 
social ones. A man is his brain, and what matters most to him is the maximal 
prolongation of the brain’s existence.20 This type of belief is called reductionism, 
and is often accepted by cognitivists.
Daniel Dennett is a brain reductionist who debates Descartes’s view on the 
substantive difference between the spiritual and somatic spheres in man. In his 
argumentation, Dennett cites research done by neuroscientists Wolf Joachim 
Singer and Gerhard Roth. Dennett has expressed the view that “the conscious 
spirit” is an illusion of our thought. A reductionist holds that human mental 
states can be elucidated in terms of physical-cerebral processes. Dennett claims 
that the individual consciousness is a postulated, theoretical, cultural, and social 
fiction which has determined our inner preferences and our general attitudes to 
the world.21 Similar conclusions can be found in the work of other neurologists; 
for instance, Gerhard Roth regards free will and the awareness of our own 
distinct “I” as cultural illusion. According to Roth, philosophers are wrong in 
ascribing to the conscious subject abilities which should be linked exclusively 
to the activity of the brain. Freedom of the will is the result of an overlapping 
of neural processes; the brain makes a person predisposed towards survival and 
adjustment to the conditions of the environment, and not towards making con-
scious and responsible decisions.22
The negation of free will undermines the essence of an agent’s responsi-
bility. The advocates of the reductionist position commonly cite experiments 
conducted by Benjamin Libet and repeated by Evelyn Keller and Heinz Heck-
with the philosophy of language. In his research, he goes beyond reductionist and naturalist 
approaches. 
19 See: David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of Fundamental Theory (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 4–5.
20 See: Thomas Nagel, “The Limits Objectivity,” in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
(Oxford: Oxford University, 1979), 78–80.
21 See: Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1993), 
237–239.
22 See: Józef Bremer, Neuronaukowy i potoczny obraz osoby w kognitywistyce (Kraków: 
Wydawnictwo WAM, 2016), 39–44.
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hausen, and later by Patrick Haggard and Michel Emmer. In a series of experi-
ments, Libet asked participants to concentrate on their willingness to act while 
observing the position of the clock’s hand and to record the time by pressing 
a button. The researchers observed that the gap between the awareness of the 
intention to act and the pressing of the button lasted 200 ms, with the margin 
of error smaller than 50 ms. Libet’s experiment showed that conscious decision 
was preceded by an unconscious activity of the brain. An external observer 
could see, on the display of his measuring devices, impulses manifesting the 
activity of the brain before the participant made a conscious decision to act. 
However, the results obtained in subsequent experiments were less unambigu-
ous. What matters to us are the philosophical conclusions that can be drawn 
from the experiment. 
Citing Libet’s experiment, brain reductionists opt for the determinist hy-
pothesis, which allows them to reject the idea of free will and espouse the idea 
that the will depends on biological and social factors. Among other like-minded 
scientists, Michael Gazzaniga regarded the conscious “I” as an illusion. In his 
view, the brains of individual people resemble automata which take decisions 
by following complex and intricate rules. Moral and legal responsibility are 
the result of a social contract entered into by brain automata in the context of 
social debate.23 This type of solution is not wholly hostile to the idea of con-
scious efficacy and self-government advocated by Wojtyła. We have to point out, 
however, that cognitive studies broaden our knowledge of brain disfunctions, in 
particular when it comes to cases where we want to discover causes of limited 
liability in persons with an impaired ability to make independent decisions and 
to understand complex legal and moral situations.24
However, the rejection of radical brain determinism does not need to lead 
to the acceptance of the opposite theory, or that of voluntarist indeterminism. 
A reasonable solution seems to lie in the acceptance of moderate determinism, 
also referred to as emergentizm, or—in more general terms—the emergentist 
conception of personhood. This position is represented, among other scholars, 
by Roger W. Sperry and Colwyn Trevarthen, and in Poland by Józef Bremer. 
According to this conception, the biological structure, having attained a certain 
23 See Michael Gazzaniga, The Law and Neuroscience Project, www.lawandneuroscience-
proect.org.
24 Besides the reductionist position, there is also a non-reductionist one represented by John 
Eccles, in which the assumption is that the nonmaterial mind influences the functioning of the 
biological brain. Many processes occur in the brain and only some of them are reflected in cere-
bral stimulations. Eccles explains the origin of human consciousness by using the principles of 
quantum mechanics. According to his hypothesis, the mind influences the functioning of the bra-
in by modifying similar stimulations of neurons on the quantum level. This conception has found 
no confirmation in subsequent empirical studies. See: Karl Popper and John Eccles, The Self and 
Its Brain. An Argument for Interactionism (London and New York: Routledge, 1977), 355–376.
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level of development and complexity, has caused the human brain to produce 
new mental and volitional properties (those of the understanding and the will). 
Thanks to this type of cerebral abilities, man can control his conduct and the 
processes occurring in the nervous system. In this sense, the conscious mind 
is capable of self-organization, self-awareness, self-control, and the control of 
a person’s behaviors, and thus of self-dependence. These capabilities are related 
to the development of language competence, to the building of interpersonal 
relations, and to the creation of narratives about oneself and linking a self-nar-
rative with narratives shared by the community. On the one hand, a person takes 
decisions based on intuition, and he or she may not be aware of their causes. 
On the other, there are conscious, purposeful, and rational actions over which 
we have a degree of control. 
Advocates of the emergentist conception of personhood assume that personal 
differences have their primary sources in society and culture. Simultaneously, 
they accept the idea of human free will in its moderate version, a position that 
can be called compatibilism. According to this idea, the human subject can 
make choices which are free to a certain degree, biological and social limi-
tations notwithstanding. Sperry and Trevarthen have based their research on 
free will on stochastic models. Their studies do not explain how the intention 
to act originates in the brain; they are good at showing the full complexity of 
the decision-making process and its outcome. They recognize the role of the 
brain’s spontaneous activity, of external signals, and those that can be related to 
“the will” and individual “beliefs.”25 It seems that the mind cannot be regarded 
merely as a function of the biological brain. From the point of view of empiri-
cal research, however, it is difficult to study the functioning of the mind as an 
object disconnected from the brain. Yet it is possible to observe states of the 
brain and relations occurring between them, and to describe them on the basis 
of the rules governing human behavior. Still, this mechanistic model will never 
depict the subjective state of the mind; this is as much to say that the conception 
of the person as an entity that is conscious and capable of voluntary acceptance 
of responsibility cannot be inferred from the idea of the body-brain.26 The brain 
constitutes a material basis for mental states, but it does not account for their 
complexity. 
Roger Sperry admits that subjective mental phenomena regulate the move-
ment in nerve cells, which takes place thanks to emergent properties. In this 
sense, we can say that the mind emerges from the brain; changes occurring 
in the brain lead to new interactions between neurons, which finally leads to 
the emergence of a new, distinct quality: the conscious, individual “I.” It is 
25 See: Józef Bremer, Neuronaukowy i potoczny obraz osoby w kognitywistyce (Kraków: 
Wydawnictwo WAM, 2013), 47–52.
26 See: Włodzisław Duch, Czy jesteśmy automatami? Mózgi, wolna wola i odpowiedzial-
ność, 229–230.
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impossible to detect the emergence of individual consciousness on the basis of 
empirical analysis. We observe the effect of this process, but we do not know 
how it occurs.27 The principles which govern the reconfiguration of the complex 
elements of the brain system that make possible the emergence of a singular and 
conscious “I” are for us impossible to elucidate. A suitable material organiza-
tion within the brain is essential for the emergence of the thought process, but 
it does not explain everything. This process is more complex and goes beyond 
biological causes. Experiences related to free will are given to us only from the 
internal perspective, while the external perspective points to the limitations of 
free choice. 
We know that neurons in the brain react to the stimuli that reach them from 
the outside world. Large groups of neurons form mesoscopic networks, which 
in turn make up larger areas that process data supplied by the senses. In this 
way, the brain builds the sensory image of an object.28 There are also emotion 
and motion maps which allow us to locate the stimuli that enable the control of 
muscles. We know much less about the higher cognitive abilities, those related 
to decision making, thinking, reasoning, and planning. 
In conclusion, we can state that the emergentist conception of the mind can 
be reconciled with Karol Wojtyła’s dynamic conception of personhood. In both 
we find premises affirming the psychosomatic unity of body and mind, despite 
the fact that this unity is construed differently. Woltyła proposes a philosophical 
and theological conception of personhood supported by phenomenological anal-
yses; in cognitive sciences, knowledge related to man is based on empirical re-
search, subsequently validated by philosophical reflection. Individual conscious-
ness—the consciousness of a person, we may add after Wojtyła—is the product 
of a dynamic change occurring in man’s body and mind. This dynamism is the 
consequence of a combination of complex structures which condition man’s life 
and development in both their biological and social dimensions. The free will in 
man does not emerge from independence of biological and social circumstances, 
but rather from a person’s concession to accept them; this autonomy is of course 
limited, as are the powers of concession. Personal freedom does not mean that 
man can ignore limitations resulting from the physical structure of the world or 
from the biological factors responsible for the functioning of the brain. 
27 See: Roger Sperry, “A Modified Concept of Consciousness,” Psychological Review,
vol. 76, no. 6 (1969): 532–536. Józef Bremer arrives at similar conclusions: Bremer, Osoba – fikcja
czy rzeczywistość, 362–387.
28 See: Włodzisław Duch, “Czy jesteśmy automatami? Mózgi, wolna wola i odpowiedzial-
ność,” in Na ścieżkach neuronauki, ed. Piotr Francuz (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL), 219–264.
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Conclusions
Brain sciences fulfil a very important role in advancing our knowledge about 
man; their unquestionable achievements cannot be ignored. At present, we are 
still at an early stage of our exploration of the complex structure of the human 
mind. Subsequent discoveries may turn out to be ground-breaking, and hence, 
from the perspective of philosophical anthropology, we need to keep a close 
watch on the findings that these sciences yield. It is not possible to prove the 
existence of the person empirically. We can examine bodies, we can analyze 
the subjective states of human consciousness, and we can study the functioning 
of man in different various social relations. We can observe the states of the 
human brain and capture in schemata the operations of the body; however, this 
mechanistic and biological model is not capable of accounting for the emergence 
of the consciousness of an individual human being. We may have no direct influ-
ence on a great number of cerebral phenomena, but we can modify the course 
of our thoughts. The conscious “I” is capable of adjusting to the conditions of 
the environment, but also of altering those conditions.
The sum total of a multiplicity of relations and connections gives shape to 
the human person, by which we mean the singular and unique individual with 
an unrepeatable record of inner experiences and reflections: the conscious hu-
man “I” capable of making free choices. In this idea of personhood, our belief 
is grounded in individual value and dignity. In this sense, the conception of 
personhood constitutes a basis not only for personalist ethics, but for every 
system of ethics which posits the value of the singularity of human life and 
individual agency. The premise concerning the singularity of existence and con-
sciousness relates to the principles of self-consciousness, self-determination, and 
self-possession propagated by Wojtyła. The values of freedom and the value of 
the person are integrally linked to each other. The negation of freedom, which is 
a consequence of some cognitive theories, leads to the making void of an indi-
vidual’s autonomy of action. In this case, the prefix “self-” becomes an illusion, 
and an individual’s actions are regarded as resulting from electric impulses in 
the brain, or from the influence of environmental factors. If we accepted the re-
ductionist premises about man, then logic would compel us to admit that norma-
tive ethics is a province of neurocybernetics, by which we understand a theory 
of controlling and modelling group behavior, or that of social engineering, based 
on algorithms of socially accepted norms of correct behavior. Regardless of how 
we evaluate the strength of Woltyła’s argumentation in his book The Acting 
Person, the assumption concerning free will constitutes an essential premise 
of any ethical theory which accepts the idea of the conscious “I.” However, we 
need to keep up with the developments in the field of cognitive studies, because 
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cognitivism provides important contributions to our knowledge of man. The 
consequences of new discoveries in this field ought to become objects of philo-
sophical, theological, and legal studies. 
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Mariusz Wojewoda
Il concetto di persona nel pensiero 
di Karol Wojtyła nella prospettiva delle scienze cognitive
Som mar io
Usiamo il termine di persona, quando vogliamo indicare l’unicità e l’eccezionalità dell’esistenza 
umana. Il presupposto che l’uomo è una persona è la base per credere nella dignità, nell’efficacia 
e nella responsabilità di un individuo. La concezione di Wojtyła è stata sviluppata nel contesto 
delle discussioni teologiche e filosofiche. Se ne è parlato molte volte, ma vale la pena confrontarla 
con le teorie antropologiche contemporanee derivate dalle scienze cognitive. I rappresentanti di 
queste scienze di solito si basano su premesse biologiche e sociali. Alcune soluzioni sviluppate 
nell’ambito delle scienze cognitive portano al riduzionismo cerebrale, in cui una persona viene 
trattata come un corpo con funzione cerebrale e le sue caratteristiche individuali sono determi-
nate dall’ambiente sociale e culturale. Questa posizione spinge a mettere in discussione l’idea del 
libero arbitrio e della sostanziale separatezza delle persone. Simultaneamente con la posizione 
riduzionista si è sviluppata anche una posizione non riduzionista, nota come emergentismo, se-
condo cui, la mente è un’abilità distinta in una persona che si manifesta a un certo stadio dello 
sviluppo del cervello. Gli emergentisti argomentano a favore del presupposto dell’unità del corpo 
e della mente non identica ad esso. Secondo l’autore dell’articolo, questo può essere applicato 
con successo alla comprensione dinamica della persona sviluppata a metà del XX secolo da 
Karol Wojtyła.
Pa role  ch iave: Karol Wojtyła, persona, natura umana, libero arbitrio, scienze cognitive
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Mariusz Wojewoda
Le concept de personne dans la pensée 
de Karol Wojtyła dans la perspective des sciences cognitives
Résu mé
Nous utilisons le terme de personne; lorsque nous voulons indiquer l’unicité et l’exceptionnalité 
de l’existence humaine. L’hypothèse que l’homme est une personne est le fondement pour croi-
re en la dignité, l’efficacité et la responsabilité d’un individu. La conception de Wojtyła a été 
développée dans un contexte de discussions théologiques et philosophiques. Elle a été maintes 
fois discutée, mais il vaut la peine de la confronter aux théories anthropologiques contemporai-
nes issues des sciences cognitives. Les représentants de ces sciences s’appuient généralement 
sur des prémisses biologiques et sociales. Certaines solutions développées au sein des sciences 
cognitives conduisent au réductionnisme cérébral, dans lequel une personne est traitée comme 
un corps doté d’une fonction cérébrale, et ses caractéristiques individuelles sont déterminées 
par l’environnement social et culturel. Cette position conduit à remettre en cause l’idée du libre 
arbitre et de la séparation substantielle des personnes. Simultanément à la position réductionni-
ste s’est développée une position non réductionniste, connue sous le nom d’émergentisme, selon 
laquelle, l’esprit est une capacité distincte dans l’homme e qui se manifeste à un certain stade 
du développement du cerveau. Les émergentistes argumentent pour la thèse de l’unité du corps 
et de l’esprit qui ne sont pas identiques. Selon l’auteur de l’article, cela peut être appliqué avec 
succès à la compréhension dynamique de la personne développée au milieu du XXème siècle par 
Karol Wojtyła.
Mots - clés : Karol Wojtyła, personne, nature humaine, libre arbitre, sciences cognitives
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